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Europe 1992 and the Evolution of the Multilateral
Trading System*
Sylvia Ostry**
I. INTRODUCTION: LAUNCHING THE URUGUAY ROUND
Early in the 1980s, when the United States began its efforts to try to
launch a New GATT Round, a mission which often seemed impossi-
ble and was not to succeed without great effort and mounting frustration
until September 1986, Gardner Patterson wrote an essay assessing the
impact of the European Community ("EC") on the world trading system
and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT").1
The judgement was harsh:
The Community's behavior creates serious problems for others and
threatens an international trading system regularly extolled by Euro-
pean authorities. It can be traced to: the structure of the E.C. and its
decision making process, which is slow, hard to predict, and has a pro-
tectionist bias; the E.C. propensity toward bilateralism and sectoral ar-
rangements, which ignore the global rules and endanger the very
possibility of maintaining international economic cooperation; the
E.C.'s tolerance of, even affection for, discriminatory practices, which
are particularly burdensome to many developing countries, the non-
market economies, and Japan; and the Community's reluctance to sup-
port effective international dispute settlement procedures, which is a
necessary element for a system based on general rules.2
Yet, the judgement was borne out by the history of the early 1980s.
* Speech delivered at the Lehrman Institute, January, 1990, New York, New York.
** Chairman, Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto; Chairman, The National
Council of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs; Western Co-Chairman, The Blue Ribbon
Commission for Hungary's Economic Recovery; Ph.D., Economics, McGill University and
Cambridge.
I The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GAT') was established after the Second
World War as a contract between trading partners that outlines rules and regulations within a multi-
laterial trading system. The GAIT, for many reasons, has found it increasingly difficult to adapt to
changes in a multilateral trading system which is under stress. One alternative, a trend to bilateral
or regional blocs and to more unilateral behavior by powerful trading countries, is likely to acceler-
ate should the Uruguay Round of the GATI' fail to deliver an acceptable package. Such a package
would have to include the extension of GATT rules well beyond traditional border measures into the
domain of what are essentially domestic policies.
2 Patterson, The European Community as a Threat to the System, in TRADE POLICY IN THE
1980's 241 (W.R. Cline ed. 1983).
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The EC was fearful of the inclusion of agriculture as a central item on the
agenda of a New GATT Round. It was also opposed to negotiations on
trade in services, an early U.S. priority. Thus, the EC effectively blocked,
and then delayed, the launch of a New Round for four years. After a
near-catastrophic Ministerial meeting in November, 1982, the EC reluc-
tantly agreed to a New Round after strong American pressure. In this
successful foot-dragging policy the EC was greatly assisted by the strong
opposition of a group of Lesser Developed Countries ("LDC's") led by
Brazil and India who were fiercely opposed to the inclusion of the so-
called new issues of services, trade-related intellectual property, and
trade-related investment measures. However, it would have been impos-
sible for these so-called hardliners to prevent GATT negotiations on
their own. Only the skilled delaying tactics of the EC gave the LDC's
the clout to block negotiations with the assistance of the EC officials be-
hind the scenes.
Why was the EC opposed to a GATT negotiation even as the pro-
tectionist fury of the United States Congress mounted as a result of the
worsening current account imbalance and rapidly deteriorating competi-
tiveness of the United States due to the overvalued dollar? The answer,
as Gardner Patterson observed, lies deeply rooted in the nature of the
policy-making process of the Commission. To a remarkable degree pro-
cess determines substance.
All international negotiations involve action on two fronts: 1) exter-
nal, between national representatives; and 2) internal, among government
bureaucracies, legislators, and interest groups. But the EC is unique in
that the key internal negotiations require the Commission to broker the
policy pressure emanating from the Member States. Private sector
groups have far less influence over policy at the Commission level com-
pared to the Member States, in marked contrast to the United States.
However, the role of the business community in creating political mo-
mentum for Europe 1992 has created, at least potentially, a stronger
linkage with the Commission which might affect the final year of the
negotiations.
The centerpiece of the EC system is the 113 Committee of national
representatives.' While only the Commission negotiating team operates
on the external front, its negotiating mandate must be secured from a
consensus in the 113 Committee drawn from the senior bureaucracies of
the Member States, or run the risk of defeat at the political level of the
Council of Ministers. In practice the core of the policy-making mecha-
nism is bureaucratic, with only infrequent Ministerial input on specific
items and no ongoing Ministerial discussion of the thrust of the broad
3 Named after the article in the Treaty of Rome which gave the Commission trade negotiating
authority.
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trade policy. As an internal bureaucratic mechanism the EC is extremely
complex to operate effectively and requires considerable strategic and
diplomatic skill on the part of the Commission negotiators. These nego-
tiators which often use these skills in their external negotiations with the
less "diplomatic" Americans.
One consequence of this "political economy of policy-making" is a
systemic bias to conservatism and inertia in trade policy. This policy is
the basic reason for the foot-dragging in the 1980s. Time was needed to
bring along the Member States, many with opposing interests especially
on agriculture. The absence of an effective mechanism for private sector
input at the Commission level also reinforced the bureaucratic inertia on
new and unfamiliar issues such as services or intellectual property, again
in marked contrast to the United States where private sector groups un-
dertook an active campaign to influence the agenda and the negotiations.
The systemic bias to conservatism and inertia has been well de-
scribed by Martin Wolf:
Like the United States, the trade policy of the European Commu-
nity is made by compromises among strongly represented regional and
industrial interests - but, even more so. Given the need for compro-
mise among member states, there is a tendency to agree on the lowest
common denominator of protection. The allegedly more liberal coun-
tries than salvage their consciences by asserting that they are compro-
mising their principles in favor of the still greater principle of
European unity. The tendency to agree on protectionism is reinforced
by the fact that decisions are ultimately taken in the Council of Minis-
ter, which will consist of the industry or agricultural ministers directly
concerned.
Another consequence of the negotiating process is to externalize
internal conflict. If, for example, the West German steel industry is
hurt by subsidies from the Italian Government to Italian producers,
the natural response is a combination of some limit on those subsidies
with greater protection against outsiders. Furthermore, because of the
nature of the European Community, it is only rarely that it can agree
on any far-reaching initiatives in global arrangements, where the run-
ning has been left almost entirely to the United States. Finally, once
reached it is only with great difficulty that a Community position can
be modified.4
There were significant, though unintended, consequences stemming,
at least in part, from the delay in the launch of the Uruguay Round. In
the context of the early 1980s the consequences consisted of: rising trade
deficits; an overvalued dollar; regionally concentrated rises in unemploy-
4 Wolf, 1992 Global Implications of the European Community's Programme for Completing
the Internal Market, 27-28 (1989) Lehrman Institute Policy Paper, Series on the U.S. in the global
economy No.1, New York; See also Patterson, supra note 2, at 223-42.
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ment; and a weakened and weakening GATT which made it more diffi-
cult for the American administration to persuade U.S. businesses that the
multilateral system was an effective guardian of American interests.
Therefore, a new GATT round was seen as a way of coping with the
rising protectionist fury of the U.S. Congress. Indeed, multilateral nego-
tiations had traditionally been favored by U.S. administrations as a pol-
icy device for containing the ever-present special interest group pressure
on Congress and the Tokyo Round, in the difficult decade of the 1970s,
had been largely successful in this regard.
Confronted by failure to change the position of the EC and the
hardline LDC's, and in an effort to increase pressure for a launch, Am-
bassador William Brock, the U.S. Trade Representative, ("U.S.T.R.") at
that time, asked the official private sector advisory committees on trade
negotiations to present their views on a new GATT round in January
1985. The report, issued in May 1985, contained some unpleasant
surprises.
The Chairman's summary provided an interesting insight into the
increasing ambivalence of American business attitudes to the GATT
since the end of the Tokyo Round in 1979. Basically it reflected mount-
ing frustration with the Reagan administration's economic policies. Af-
ter stressing that action was urgently required on the exchange rate and
fiscal front the Report stated:
While support for a new round among the groups contacted
ranged from strong support to strong opposition, the broadest consen-
sus on a New Round can best be described as moderate support pro-
vided that parallel efforts, both domestic and international, are
undertaken to address the cause of AMerican trade problems. The
broadest concern over entering a new round is that it would detract
from, or even replace, efforts to develop a national trade policy (empha-
sis added).5
The summary goes on to point out that support for the New GATT
Round was strong only among those groups advocating the inclusion of
the new issues of services, intellectual property, and investment. In sum,
the American business view by mid-decade was best summarized as ac-
ceptance of unilateral negotiations on three conditions: inclusion of the
new issues; a new exchange rate policy; and a new national trade policy.
The exchange rate policy was delivered on September 22, 1985 by
the Plaza Accord.6 On September 23, 1985 the new trade policy was
5 Chairmen's Report on a New Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 3, Submitted to the
United States Trade Representative, May 15, 1985, Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations.
6 Agreement made at the Plaza Hotel in New York among sixty-five countries including the
United States, Japan, West Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. The Finance Ministers
designed an agreement to decrease the value of the U.S. dollar vis-a-vis other major currencies. The
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announced in a speech by President Reagan and in an official report by
the U.S.T.R.
For the first time in the postwar period the trade policy was multi-
track including: continuing efforts to launch a New GATT Round; bilat-
eral free trade agreements where appropriate; and more active self-initia-
tion of the little-used section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act to deal with
other countries unfair trade practices, through retaliation if necessary.7
The major development on the bilateral track was the initiation of negoti-
ations for a U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement. On the 301 track the
major development was greater use of self-initiation under the 1974 pro-
visions and the expanded provisions for unilateralism contained in the
1988 Omnibus Trade Act.
While it is clearly impossible to "prove" that an early launch of a
multilateral round would have prevented the emergence of a new direc-
tion in U.S. trade policy, there seems little doubt that the feelings of an-
ger and impotence stemming from the delay were an important factor in
both the FTA with Canada and the expansion of unilateralism. In the
former instance, the negotiations with Canada served as a "strategic
threat" to both the EC and the LDC's that there were effective alterna-
tives to the GATT. The unilateralist 301 thrust reflected the view that
the GATT had become increasingly inadequate especially in dealing with
a range of practices, many of which were domestic, which "unfairly"
distort trade and that in the absence of multilateral rules unilateral defi-
nitions and actions may be the only alternative.
In sum, when the New GATT Round was finally launched at Punta
del Este in Uruguay in September 1986, the U.S. administration shifted
from its traditional overriding and singular commitment to multilateral-
ism - an inheritance from its postwar position of undisputed hegemony
- to a more complex policy stance whose evolution remains uncertain.
Indeed, future developments on the bilateral or unilateral front will be
strongly affected by the outcome of the Uruguay Round in December,
1990.
If U.S. trade policy has changed direction, what are the implications
for change in the EC as 1992 approaches? The impact of 1992 on the
EC's role in the Uruguay Round is difficult to discern. The preoccupa-
tion of the Commission with the internal market in the first few years of
the negotiations probably slowed an already inertial policy-making pro-
policy involved coordinated central bank intervention into currency markets in order to stabilize
exchange rates. For a further explanation of the Plaza Accord see Y. Funabashi, Managing the
Dollar: From the Plaza Accord to the Louvre 9-42 (1988) Institute for International Economics,
Washington.
7 It is of interest to note that section 301 itself was largely the reflection of frustration with
GATT dispute settlement procedures which needed basic reform, a reform effectively blocked by the
EC during the Tokyo Round.
1990]
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cess. Indeed, it was not until October, 1988, just before the Mid Term
Review in Montreal, that any information on the external implications of
the internal market was released and even then many questions remained
unanswered. In fact, it was largely this lack of information which cre-
ated uncertainty and suspicion in some quarters and added to the talk of
Fortress Europe. Perhaps, the main effect of Europe 1992 has been the
greater confidence of the Commission whose role has been strengthened
as a result of the major success in the internal market exercise. A
stronger Commission with a more liberal bent may be more effective dur-
ing the final year of the Uruguay Round. Thus far "the jury is out" on
the outcome. This cautious stance is best illustrated by examining some
of the key agenda items on the Uruguay Round.
II. THE URUGUAY ROUND
The Uruguay Round is the most comprehensive and ambitious
round of negotiations in the history of the GATT. In addition, more
than any previous round, it is focused on the international spillover of
domestic policies. The fifteen negotiation groups cover four principal
categories: 1) market access including tariff and non-tariff barriers in
manufactured goods and, for the first time in forty years, in agriculture;
2) the so-called new issues of trade-related investment measures, the
trade-related aspects of intellectual property right, such as patents and
copyrights, and trade in service; 3) reform of GA TT rules such as rules
concerning subsidies and the actions governments may take to offset
them (countervailing duties), rules about measures governments may
take when import surges threaten serious injury to domestic industries
(safeguards), rules which govern government actions to counter dump-
ing, rules concerning government procurement; and 4) measures to
strengthen GATT as an institution by establishing more effective and
streamlined dispute settlement procedures, establishing better links be-
tween the GATT, the World Bank, and the International Monetary
Fund, instituting procedures to review countries' trade policies and ac-
tions and giving more ministerial direction to GATT's work.
On all agenda items, of course, the role of the EC is crucially impor-
tant since the Community, along with the United States and Japan, is
part of the so-called Triad which will play a dominant role in shaping the
world trading system for the foreseeable future. However, some agenda
items are more significant than others, since they are strategic to the
package as a whole, i.e. "round breakers or makers." Agriculture is
clearly in this category, as are the new issues of services, trade-related
intellectual property, and investment measures. Thus, it is useful to re-
view the EC position on both agriculture and the new issues. Another
item worthy of discussion is antidumping regulation which, though
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scarcely visible in the Punta declaration, have become highly contentious
in the past several years due to developments in Community practice.
The developments have coincided with the move to complete the internal
market and are probably linked to the growing concern of the Commis-
sion with the issue of competitiveness, especially vis-a-vis the Japanese.
Reform of antidumping is also linked to reform of safeguards, an issue
for which the EC policy stance will be critically important.
Finally, a brief review of the efforts to improve the GATT dispute
settlement procedure is relevant to the need to contain U.S. unilateralist
tendencies and more generally to enhance and strengthen the rule-based
multilateral system.
A. Agriculture
Agriculture has virtually remained outside GATT discipline for
forty years throughout seven negotiating rounds. Because it was treated
by both the United States and the European Community as peripheral it
was possible for the two main players to agree to disagree on agriculture
and not jeopardize the rest of the negotiation in other sectors. The Uru-
guay Round is quite different. Agriculture is a central item. This change
was due to the high priority attached to reform of domestic agricultural
policies by the United States and to the fact that such reform, a sine qua
non for reducing or eliminating the deleterious spillover effects on trade,
was the key issue for a large number of agricultural exporters in both the
developed and developing world. A coalition of these small and me-
dium-sized countries, the Cairns group, has played an important role in
both the launch and the negotiations of the Uruguay Round.
The agricultural negotiations provide a good illustration of the com-
plexity of the Uruguay negotiations as compared with earlier rounds.
Not only is the role of non-Triad country coalitions unprecedented, the
Cairns group is simply the best known of several which have been organ-
ized around different agenda items, but the negotiating strategy of the
United States and other developed countries, such as Canada, Australia,
and New Zealand, include utilizing other multilateral fora such as the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD")
and the Economic Summit to shape the GATT negotiations. Thus, the
OECD analytic device of the Producer Subsidy Equivalent ("PSE"), by
bringing to light in a summary index number the "quantum" of interven-
tion in each country, played a crucial role in forcing the debate which
finally got agriculture on the Uruguay Round Agenda at a number of
OECD Ministerial Meetings and Summits. Equally important, the
OECD analysis shaped the context of the negotiations by focusing on the
root cause of the trade distortions, the domestic intervention in the agri-
cultural sector.
1990]
CASE W. RES. J. IN77L LV
This context has, however, created a serious dilemma for the EC
which has always argued that the "basic mechanisms" of the Common
Agricultural Policy ("CAP"), the two-price system and the border pro-
tection in the unique form of the so-called variable levy, are non-negotia-
ble. While the subsidy wars which began after the passage of the 1985
Farm Act in the United States and was exacerbated by the fall in the
dollar after Plaza, they did create enough budgetary pressure on the EC
to induce a modification of the CAP to stabilize expenditures in Febru-
ary, 1988. This result was a by-product of the need to increase funds for
regional stabilization in the context of Europe 1992. The true nature of
the EC's fundamental and unchanged dilemma was starkly revealed at
the Montreal Ministerial Mid-Term Review in December 1988.
The negotiating proposal of the United States at Montreal was dra-
matically simple. If government subsidies are the root cause of trade
distortions then the objective of the negotiations should be to eliminate
them over a specified time period, say by the year 2000. This was the so-
called zero-2000 proposal. The position of the United States also in-
cluded the idea of "uncoupling." For instance, if governments wished to
subsidize farmers they should do so in a non trade-distorting way by
direct income transfers rather than by intervention in markets which
blocked off price signals.
The EC position at Montreal focused mainly on the short-term or
ending the expensive subsidy war and was vague on the nature and tim-
ing of long-term reform. The Cairns Group effort to bridge the gap be-
tween the two combatants failed and the result was that, although
progress had been agreed to in eleven out of fifteen negotiating groups,
the Latin American Cairns Group members withdrew their agreement
on these items, in effect threatening an end to the Round. Only a proce-
dural safeguard by the GATT secretariat, deferring the adjournment of
the meeting until April, saved the negotiations from a premature demise.
In April, a consensus document which unblocked the negotiations
emerged after much effort on the part of the GATT secretariat. A quick
reading suggested that the EC had achieved an important "victory." For
the objective of long-term reform the phrase "substantial progressive re-
duction ... sustained over an agreed period of time" replaced the inflam-
matory "elimination by 2000." The detailed proposals for the
achievement of long-term reform and other issues were to be tabled by
the end of 1989.
The main negotiating proposal tabled by the United States at the
end of November 1989 was comprehensive and specific. It included
measures to reform market access, internal support, and export subsidies.
To reform market access, it proposed tariffication which entails con-
verting all barriers to tariffs, which could then be negotiated away over
ten years. Regarding on internal support, the proposal suggested a form
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of modified subsidies code which would include elimination or discipline.
On export subsidies, the United States proposed a five year elimination
plan.
Thus, the U.S. proposal, predictably greeted by the EC as reneging
on the April agreement, would require a fundamental reform of the
CAP. The Commission proposal, tabled in late December, while admit-
ting that there is some scope for the scaling down of both export subsi-
dies and import barriers, rejected their elimination over a specified time
period. It accepted a partial tariffication of the variable import levy
which was a significant concession to the U.S. proposal but diluted it by
proposing a "rebalancing" of barriers, by raising some as other are low-
ered. In addition, the Commission proposal firmly emphasized rejection
of the idea of "free trade" in agricultural products which would lead to a
"chaotic situation." Thus, the fundamental position of the EC remained
as guardian of the principles of the CAP, however modified, because as it
said: "The Community remains convinced that such arrangements (i.e.
elimination of subsidies and protection) are not viable .... This boils
down to extending to all internal markets the chronic instability which
rules world markets." The overall theme of the EC is, indeed, better
market management. The aim of the Uruguay Round "can only be to
progressively reduce support to the extent necessary to re-establish bal-
anced markets . ..." The objective of reform is not more liberalized
markets but the reduction of expenditure on export subsidies by increas-
ing international prices and minimizing any increased access for imports
to the Community.
It is difficult to forecast the outcome of the basic conflict over the
role of markets in this uniquely protected sector in agriculture between
the United States and the European Community. An agreement to disa-
gree, and thus avoid any major reform, which has worked in all previous
Rounds may not be feasible this time due to the coalition bargaining ap-
proach which has emerged in the Uruguay Round. For some LDC's,
especially in Latin America, the rest of the agenda does not offer much,
so they may feel compelled to repeat the Mid-Term strategy which up-
held agreement on other "new issues" of high priority to the EC and the
United States. The outcome on agriculture will have to await the negoti-
ation of the full package at the Brussels Ministerial meeting to conclude
the Round at the end of 1990.
B. The New Issues
While initially opposed to the inclusion of new issues on the Uru-
guay Round agenda, the EC now supports their inclusion especially in
the area of services and trade-related intellectual property measures. To
8 Agra - Europe, London, No. 1368, Dec. 15, 1989, at P11-P12.
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a considerable degree this change in position reflects not the impact of
Europe 1992 but the policy activism of the U.S. private sector.
The private sector in the United States, especially business, plays a
uniquely important role in policy-making. This reflects the American
system of governance including: the extraordinary diffusion of power es-
tablished by the Constitution; the absence of a permanent bureaucratic
elite; and the emphasis on transparency; the multiple avenues for public
participation in policy. Given the susceptibility of a decentralized, un-
disciplined Congress to special interest pressures, the Administration has
utilized the device of what has been termed anti-protectionist
"counterweights" for diverting and managing protectionist pressures.
One key element in the counterweight system is the private sector advi-
sory committee structure originally established under the 1974 Trade
Act which launched the Tokyo Round. It was the Advisory Committee
for Trade Policy and Negotiations ("ACPTN"), the top "oversight"
committee in this structure, in cooperation with other U.S. business
groups, which undertook the task of convincing European and Japanese
corporations to lobby for the new issues. In fact, in the services sector
U.S. activism extended well beyond the Triad; nine country service co-
alitions have been organized and meet regularly in Geneva with the
GATT secretariat. In the case of intellectual property the U.S. group,
working through two major industrial organizations, UNICE in Europe
and Keidanren in Japan, persuaded their counterparts to table, in Ge-
neva, a detailed trilateral proposal for an intellectual property agreement
in the GATT which U.S. experts had drafted. 9 These two instances,
services and intellectual property, are the only examples of European
business playing a role in the Uruguay Round negotiations.
In services the EC position is essentially in harmony with that of the
OECD group of countries recognizing the need for the Uruguay Round
to produce a broad framework of principles for negotiation, a General
Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS"). This would provide the ba-
sis for continuing sectoral negotiations presumably commencing in 1991.
Although there is some disagreement between the United States and the
EC on the tactical issue of how best to ensure that all major sectors are
included in the subsequent negotiations, the basic approach is not at is-
sue. The major disagreement on services negotiations remains with the
developing countries. However, these countries have significantly modi-
fied their initial extreme opposition.
The heated transatlantic debate over the issue of "reciprocity"
which was unleashed when the EC issued the first draft of the banking
directive in 1988, which helped spark the allegation of Fortress Europe,
9 Edmund Pratt (Chairman and CEO of Pfizer), Intellectual Property and United States Trade
Professor Policy, Speech before the Conference Board, New York, Oct. 3, 1989, at 13-18.
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was largely defused by a second version of the directive in 1989 which
watered down, but does not eliminate, the reciprocity provisions. This
change is generally taken as a sign of greater liberalism in the current
Commission. It must be expected, however, that sectoral negotiations in
services will put pressure on the United States, Japan and other indus-
trial nations to undertake reform, especially of their financial markets, in
the direction of greater access. The enormous size and wealth of a fully
integrated EC market in services will provide a very powerful bargaining
lever to promote this desirable liberalization.
As in services, there is no disagreement between the EC and the
major OECD countries in the area of trade-related intellectual property
("TRIPS"). The basic conflict is with many developing countries, led by
India, who are strongly resisting negotiations aimed at eventual conver-
gence in the basic norms and standards of intellectual property law. The
extent of divergence in these laws among the industrialized countries is
minimal compared with the wide differences in protection, especially in
patents, afforded by the LDC's. As a major source of intellectual prop-
erty the EC has a strong interest in improving protection especially in a
period of accelerating technological change. Indeed, improvement in in-
tellectual property rights has become a key element in the broader inno-
vation policy thrust of the EC as part of the internal market completion.
Finally, in the third new issue, trade-related investment measures
("TRIMS") after lagging behind the United States for some time, the EC
put forward a major and comprehensive proposal in December 1989.
The proposal suggests so-called "red light" rules or prohibitions for a list
of eight TRIMS. This approach was first suggested by the United States,
in July 1989 and since then has gained support from Japan and the
EFTA countries. Again, the idea of international rules curtailing invest-
ment measures is strongly opposed to by many LDC's, especially India.
American leadership in this area may become more difficult as tension
over foreign investment in the United States increases in Congress and
with the general American public. Indeed, American developments may
have been a factor in strengthening the EC and Japanese commitment to
a major outcome in the Uruguay Round, as an insurance policy against
investment protectionism not only in developing countries but perhaps
even in the United States.
In summary, after initial reluctance the EC has adopted a strongly
supportive position on the new issues of the Uruguay Round. Part of
this change may be due to the impact of Europe 1992 and the greater
confidence it has generated, especially in the private sector. But much of
the private sector interest resulted from the initiative of U.S. business
groups.
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C. Antidumping
As previously mentioned, the reform of the 1979 GATT Code on
Antidumping was not an issue of concern at the outset of the Uruguay
Round in 1986. Since that time, however, antidumping cases have in-
creased enormously, especially in the EC and the United States, although
Australia and Canada are also big users. Furthermore, antidumping
laws have been adopted by a number of developing countries, providing
increasing opportunity to offset the structural adjustment liberalizing re-
forms of the World Bank. Antidumping seems to have become the
"weapon of choice" for protectionists.
Because the nature of world trade is changing, with globally inte-
grated production especially in high technology sectors being far more
important today then in the 1970s, and because the Tokyo Code was
rather general and imprecise in a number of respects, the EC and, to a
lesser extent, the United States has undertaken changes in antidumping
laws, regulations, and administrative procedures which amount to unilat-
eral changes in the multilateral rules. These developments in the EC
have proved to be highly contentious and have ensured that the extent
and nature of the reform of antidumping will be a key determinant of the
success of the Uruguay Round in constraining protectionism in the
1990s. Thus, this evolution in antidumping has become very important.
Once again the idea of process affecting substance is key to under-
standing recent changes in EC antidumping practice. The role of the
Commission in the EC antidumping system has been compared with that
of an "examining magistrate," in contrast to the quasi-judicial mecha-
nism of the United States1" The most important reason for this differ-
ence lies in the different degree of transparency of the two systems,
specifically as it affects the disclosure of confidential information. Under
American law, counsel for interested parties can obtain information sub-
mitted by other parties in the proceeding. In the EC only non-confiden-
tial information is divulged to other parties and the Commission has a
good margin of discretion in determining whether information qualifies
as confidential. As Edwin Vermulst says:
In the absence of a system of disclosure of confidential information, as
is the case in the EEC ... the investigating authorities are the only
ones with access to the complete file. Non-confidential summaries are
generally of limited value. This leads to parties "shooting in the dark"
at each other and to the undesirable situation that in many cases there
are no external checks on the investigators until it is too late, i.e. in
court. 
11
10 Vermulst, The Antidumping Systems ofAustralia, Canada, the EEC and the U.S.A., in AN-
TIDUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 430 (1989).
1 Id. at 431.
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This relative lack of transparency has the consequence of providing
a much greater leeway for administrative discretion by the Commission.
This leeway is further enhanced by a judicial review mechanism whereby
the European Court of Justice has limited its scope of review to proce-
dure and has eschewed economic substance. This is best captured by a
typical quote of a Court judgement:
In considering these (and similar) arguments where the Council or the
Commission is required to appraise complex economic situations (as in
an antidumping proceeding), the Court limits its review of such an
appraisal to verifying whether the relevant procedural rules have been
complied with, whether the facts on which the choice is based have
been accurately stated and whether there has been a manifest error of
appraisal or a misuse of powers. 12
These two factors, limited transparency and limited review, plus the
preponderant role of the Commission, which determines dumping mar-
gins and injury, combine to enlarge discretion and limit countervalence
in the system. The role of the Council of Ministers is, as Bellis states,
largely limited to "rubber stamping the proposals for definitive action
submitted by the Commission." The Council has the power to enact leg-
islation but "the Commission plays an essential role in the E.C. legisla-
tive process: amendments to the EEC Antidumping Regulations - can
be adopted by the Council only upon a proposal to that effect by the
Commission."13
An interesting side-effect of this combination of lack of disclosure of
confidential information, limited judicial review, and concentration of
authority in the Commission, is the EC calculation of dumping margins,
a key element of the entire system. It amounts to a marked tilt in EC
practice toward finding dumping, particularly against Japanese firms and
firms from the Asian NIE's exporting new products, especially informa-
tion technology, for which substantial services ancillary to the sale such
as marketing, advertising, and distribution are required. 4 These meth-
odological developments, initiated by the Commission, were codified in
an amendment to the regulations in July, 1988.
The same amendment provided another extension of EC antidump-
ing, which also seems to be targeted at the same countries and products.
As Hindley explains:
12 I-indley, Dumping and the Far East Trade of the European Community, THE WORLD ECON-
OMY, Dec. 1988, at 455.
13 Bellis, The EECAntidumping System, in ANTIDUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE: A COMPAR-
ATIVE APPROACH 45 (1989).
14 Vermulst, Antidumping Law and Practice in the United States and the European Communi-
ties: A Comparative Analysis, 497-98 (1987). See also B. Hindley, Unfair Trade and Unfair Trade
Measures: Which Threatens the World Trading System?, Commonwealth Seminar, London, July
1988.
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The central point of the extension is that where the exporter bears the
antidumping duty, an additional duty may be imposed to compensate
for the amount borne by the exporter. The extension provides that any
party directly concerned can initiate an investigation by presenting evi-
dence to the Commission that the resale price to the first independent
buyer has not raised his Community prices by the full amount of an
antidumping duty can initiate an investigation; and the investigation is
very likely to result in the imposition of an additional duty .... The
measure affects only products that pay an antidumping duty .... The
measure affects only products that pay an antidumping duty. Thus it
again bears with full force on the products from Japan and the FarEast.15
These products largely come from information and technology sectors.
Steps to ensure that an antidumping duty is borne by consumers is pre-
sumably designed to permit domestic industry to gain or maintain mar-
ket share. Foreign firms who anticipate such action by a government
will, of course, raise their prices in advance. Price rigidity, or even
cartellization, seems to be a potential outcome of such a policy thrust.
In addition to these methodological developments, which are ab-
struse but powerful in impact, there have been other significant changes
in EC antidumping policies in the past few years. In response to the
problem of "circumvention" of antidumping penalties against final prod-
ucts by assembly in Europe, the EC adopted an amendment in June,
1987 to deal with so-called "screwdriver" plants to permit extension of
antidumping penalties under specified conditions including when:
- assembly or production is carried out by a party which is related
to or associated with any of the manufacturers whose exports of
the like product are subject to a definitive antidumping duty.
- the assembly or production was started or substantially increased
after the opening of the antidumping investigation.
- the value of parts or materials originating in the dumping country
used in the assembly or production of such a product must exceed
the value of all Community parts or materials by at least 50%.
(What this amounts to is that if more than 60% of the parts origi-
nate in the dumping country, dumping will be found, i.e. 60%
exceeds 40% by 50%).
This provision extends the application of antidumping duties to im-
ports of parts without any prior finding of dumping of the parts. The
sixty percent rule of origin is being interpreted by companies as a forty
percent local content rule even though technically it is not. Within a few
15 Hindley, supra note 12, at 446-47. The July 1988 codification represents a significant change
in the provisions applicable to calculating margins from that previously followed. The change,
which resulted in the "tilt" against products in electronics from Japan and the NIE's was developed
by the Commission over the past few years. See Bellis, supra note 13, at 81-83.
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months, as numerous observers have noted, the Japanese-owned compa-
nies concerned began to increase their use of Community parts to meet
or exceed the forty percent "threshold" of Community-value
components.16
But the repercussions of the screwdriver amendment did not stop
there. Semiconductor firms in the United States who are major exporters
to Europe are feeling pressure from European buyers to expand produc-
tion in Europe; an area already well serviced by U.S. semiconductor sub-
sidiaries. The same pressures are inducing Japanese and Korean firms to
invest in Europe.
There is, as the EC has repeatedly stated, no Community local con-
tent rule. The behavior of the firms is anticipatory or perhaps simply, as
the EC has argued, based on misinformation. But, as the Chairman of
Intel has put it: "We have lost business already .... 'You can't pick up a
piece of paper that says why Intel has got to manufacture in Europe ....
The rules don't exist. But customer concerns are driving important deci-
sions right now.' "17 In October, 1989 Intel announced that it would
establish a manufacturing plant in Ireland, its first such in Europe.
In yet another development stemming from a rule of origin, the EC
charged a Japanese photocopying company, Ricoh, with circumventing
the payment of dumping duties imposed in February, 1987 on direct ex-
ports from Japan by exporting to Europe from its California plant.
Again, one might interpret this, however incorrect technically, as a for-
eign-determined U.S. local content decision. The required amendment to
the rules of origin for photocopiers, to codify this administrative deci-
sion, was adopted in July, 1989.
This new rule of origin is unusual in that it takes a negative ap-
proach by listing the manufacturing operations that do not confer origin
but does not provide guidelines as to what operations do confer origin.
Since enforcement is carried out by national customs officials, if an ex-
porter disagrees with the decision, he must first appeal to the national
customs authorities and, if this fails, to the European Court of Justice.
There have been a number of other changes or "clarifications" in
rules of origin. Of particular significance have been those in the informa-
tion technology area. In February, 1989 the Commission announced a
rule of origin for integrated circuits, which specified the country where
the process of "diffusion" takes place as the determinant of origin. Once
again, this was interpreted as a signal that the most significant technolog-
ical process of manufacturing should be located in the EC and set in train
16 Lee & Herzstein, RC. Dumping Law: A Growing Source of Trade Frictions, 1992: THE
EXTERNAL IMPACT OF EUROPEAN UNIFICATION PART 2 11 (July 28, 1989).
17 Auerbach, U.S. Chipmakers Accuse EC of Threatening Curbs, Wash. Post, Aug. 2, 1989, at
F1, col. 6, F4, col. 2.
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a number of investment decisions by Japanese firms. Those U.S. subsidi-
aries in Europe who import circuits from plants in other part of the
world, where the diffusion process takes place, have expressed concern
that this is a signal of local content pressure.18 However, in technical
terms, it is simply a clarification of an existing 1968 regulation defining a
product's origin as where the "last substantial process or operation that
is economically justifiable was performed." Similar "clarifications" are
expected on a number of other information technology products.
A basic problem is that rules of origin do not come under the
GATT. Indeed, there are no meaningful international rules governing
national decisions in this area. The Customs Cooperation Council
("CCC") adopted the Kyoto Convention in 1973, which laid down broad
general principles for national origin systems, but there is no dispute set-
tlement mechanism and no procedure to review national practices.
Moreover, some major trading countries such as the United States have
never accepted even the broad guidelines of the Kyoto Convention. The
Secretariat of the CCC has been given no mandate by its Member States
beyond compiling compendia of national regulations. Thus, the scope
for discretion in the determination and application of rules is very broad.
It is of interest that the issue has now been brought to the GATT by the
United States and others in connection with reform of the antidumping
code in the Uruguay Round.
In summary, the EC system of applying the trade remedy law of
antidumping allows significant scope for administrative discretion. The
developments of the past several years suggest that antidumping regula-
tion has become an instrument of industrial policy.
Opposition to the proliferation and extension of antidumping has
mounted, not only from countries in the Pacific Rim but also from the
private sector in the United States who find the cost of intermediate
products and components increasingly burdensome. On the other hand,
those industries which are key users are calling for a much tougher code.
It is noteworthy that the United States and European semiconductor in-
dustries have joined forces to lobby their governments for more rapid
and reinforced antidumping provisions to deal with "a concerted raid or
industrial targeting effort (that) . . . can wipe out the production and
industry of another country in one year ... due to very short, life-times
of high-tech goods." 9 Thus, the outcome of antidumping reform in the
Uruguay Round is quite uncertain although, fortunately, it has become a
18 EC Likely to Create 80% Content Rule for Autos Under 1992 Plan, 6 INT'L TR. REP. (BNA)
No. 13, at 395 (Mar. 29, 1989).
19 U.S. European Industries Rush Antidumping Reforms, No. 17, at 5 (Dec. 1, 1989). 1992:
THE EXTERNAL IMPACT OF EUROPEAN UNIFICATION, Buraff Publications
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key issue and a number of proposals both from the big "users" and the
big "targets" are on the table in Geneva.
As both the Commission's actions and the statement from the semi-
conductor industry suggest, what is at issue is concern about "strategic
industries" and not simply a trade remedy against "unfair" business
practices.20 So the use of antidumping as an industrial policy instrument
by the EC must be viewed in the context of a broader policy concern
about international competitiveness. The Commission's mandate to co-
ordinate trade, competition, and technology policies was fully clarified
and legitimized as the European Technology Community ("ETC")
which was incorporated into the Single European Act and was a key
factor in the launch of Europe 1992. A number of programs in research
and development policy have been initiated. These programs are jointly
funded by the Commission and industry, and target precompetitive re-
search in selected sector. Many of these have focused on information
technology and the view of the European Information Technology Indus-
try Roundtable, contained in a May 1989 White Paper is instructive in
this respect:
Up to now, R&D initiatives of the Commission... have created confi-
dence and strengthened cooperation... (But) concentrating on R&D
cooperation is no longer sufficient .... The next step should be to set a
goal-oriented strategy with the objective of gaining competitive advan-
tage. This requires the creation of major initiatives targeted at specific
market and technologies.21
However, such initiatives might evolve in response to what is con-
sidered to be successful Japanese policies targeting strategic industries.
Therefore, the international friction which is bound to be generated will
not be contained simply by a reform of antidumping in the Uruguay
Round, no matter how desirable that would be.
Finally, a necessary, but insufficient, condition for reform of the
trade remedy laws in the Uruguay Round would be a comprehensive
agreement on safeguards, to deal with "fair" trade. In some respects,
over the 1980s, anti-dumping became a thinly disguised selective safe-
guard action against increased imports in the same way that voluntary
export restraints ("VER's") and similar measures have been used in lieu
of the GATT - sanctioned article 19.
The sticking point in safeguard reform during the Tokyo Round was
the demand by the EC for selective application which was strongly op-
20 See Sylvia Ostry, Governments and Corporations in a Shrinking World- Trade and Innova-
tion Policies in the United States, Europe and Japan. Council on Foreign Relations, New York,
1990, Chapter 3.
21 European Information Technology Industry Roundtable, White Pater on the European IT
Industry and the Single Market, at 13, Brussels (May 16, 1989).
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posed by the LDC's. They argued, and continue to agree that by legaliz-
ing selectivity the basic GATT principle of nondiscrimination would be
seriously undermined. The present U.S. position is not entirely clear but
could probably support either "consensual" or agreed selectivity or non-
discrimination ("MFN").
The paradox is clear. Countries have refrained from using article 19
and chosen instead selective VER's or the trade remedy laws which, by
definition, are selectively applied.
These choices are also preferable because they do not require the
country that invokes them to "compensate" the exporting country by
liberalizing trade for products other than those subject to the safeguard
action; they involve, instead, a transfer of income from consumers to the
foreign producer, who holds the quota, by way of higher profits or rents.
Since consumers rarely are organized enough to complain, the politics of
VER's seem attractive.
One way around this conundrum would be to include selectivity as
part of a "menu of options" in a revised safeguard clause. But in order to
constrain its use, different "prices" should be charged for each item on
the menu. Thus, for example, if the most desirable option is protection
by tariff on an MFN basis, the price for that should be very low; limited
compensation combined with a gradual reduction of the tariff over a
specified time period. Selective protection by quantitative restriction,
preferably negotiated by the importing and exporting country, should be
the most "expensive option"; substantial compensation and significant
reduction of the quotas over a relatively short time period. Other combi-
nations could obviously be added to the menu. A surveillance mecha-
nism, geared to monitoring the adjustment of the protected industry and
publicizing VER's negotiated outside the GATT safeguard arrangement
would also be desirable. Second helpings of any item on the menu should
carry a very high price tag. After all, the Multi Fibre Arrangement has
gone on for over twenty-five years and consumers have paid an enormous
bill.
D. Dispute Settlement
As pointed out, the Uruguay Round agenda includes an attempt, for
the first time since the founding of the GATT, to strengthen the system
per se, including the dispute settlement procedure. It is not much use
having "rules of the road" if they can be violated with impunity.
At the Mid-Term Ministerial Meeting significant progress was made
in this area. The right to a panel was agreed to a right which the EC had
opposed in previous negotiations and deadlines for various phases were
set so that the process could be significantly tightened and streamlined.
The aim of this new, speedier approach was to reduce the need for the
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United States to invoke retaliation as required in sections of the 1988
Omnibus Trade Act. But an effort by the United States and many other
countries to ensure that the finding of a dispute panel could not be
blocked by the veto of the "offender" was rejected by the EC This posi-
tion reflected what Gardner Patterson described as the Community's
traditional reluctance to support effective international dispute settle-
ment procedures.
However, given the new concern with unilateralism the two remain-
ing issues in dispute settlement to be agreed on by the end of the round,
the right of adoption and of implementation of panel findings, have be-
come important. The EC position in this respect will be key to systemic
reform. Only a more effective GATT mechanism would provide protec-
tion in the face of the powerful unilateralist tendencies embodied in the
301 provisions of the 1988 U.S. Trade Act.
II. CONCLUSION
This review of "Europe 1992 and the GATT" is difficult to summa-
rize. The role of the EC fits the description of the curate's egg, parts of it
are excellent. On the new issues, a strengthened EC may play a positive
role both in supporting a strong outcome and in achieving a feasible com-
promise with the LDC opponents. On agriculture, however, prospects
for a significant reform of the trade-distorting intervention of the CAP
do not appear bright. More significantly, the emergence of new sources
of international friction in the struggle for international competitiveness,
of which changes in antidumping practice are but one manifestation, sug-
gest that even if the Uruguay Round is a resounding success a further
reinforcement and extension of multilateralism would be necessary to
cope with the "new issues" of the 1990s. What is needed is another
round to commence in 1991. The multi-track trade policy of the United
States no longer guarantees that other countries can rely on the creator
of the GATT to be its sole defender. There seems to be little evidence to
date that the "new Europe" will assume the mantle of global leadership
for the foreseeable future. This conclusion can only be reinforced by the
events in Eastern Europe which will certainly claim the attention of the
Commission for some time.
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